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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
merchantable coal owned and mined by the seller. In an action against the
buyer by the seller for the purchase price of the coal delivered under the con-
tract, the buyer admitted liability but filed a cross petition for damages suf-
fered through the seller's failure to deliver all of its output. Held: the buyer
has the burden of proving that it actually had a market for any coal not
properly delivered by the seller.
WALTER PROBERT
TAXATION
Sales and Use Taxes
The cases arising under the sales and use taxes during the past year were
concerned for the most part with the problem of whether the transactions in
question came within the definition of a taxable sale, Section 5739.01 Ohio
Revised Code (Section 5546-1, Ohio General Code), or within the exemp-
tion provisions of Section 5739.02 Ohio Revised Code (Section 5546-2,
Ohio General Code)
For example, in one case' a retailer followed the practice of delivering
goods to a prospective customer on approval. That is, the prospective cus-
tomer was given a period of time within which he could accept or reject the
goods, and until that time he neither paid, nor agreed to pay, anything for
delivery. The supreme court held that no sales tax was due upon such a
conditional delivery because there was no transfer of possession for a con-
sideration within the meaning of sales tax act Section 5739.01 Ohio Re-
vised Code (Section 5546-1, Ohio General Code) The term "considera-
tion" is not to be given a highly technical definition the court said.
In a second case,2 a lumber company entered into a quantity sale contract
with builder to sell lumber at 90 per cent of the seller's list price. The con-
tract provided, however, that if the dollar value of the lumber purchased
reached a specified sum, the sales price would be reduced to 80 per cent of
the seller's list price. Sales tax was billed and paid at the 90 per cent figure.
Eventually the dollar value of the lumber sold reached the stipulated amount,
and the purchaser were re-billed and the sales tax was recomputed. The
seller then applied to the Tax Commissioner for a refund. The refund was
allowed by the supreme court on the theory that the transaction was not con-
summated and completely performed within Section 5739.01 Ohio Revised
Code (Section 5546-1, Ohio General Code) until the last materials were
finally purchased. Therefore, the recomputation was not a "discount
allowed after the sale is consummated" which under Section 5739.01 Ohio
1 Kloepfer s, Inc. v. Peck, 158 Ohio St. 577, 110 N.E.2d 560 (1953).
'Columbus Southern Lumber Co. v. Peck, 159 Ohio St. 564, 113 N.E.2d 1 (1953)
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Revised Code (Section 5546-1, Ohio General Code) could not be deducted
from the "price" in determining the amount of tax which must be paid.
The court found that the Tax Commissioner's Rule 50 was contrary in part
to Section 5739.01 Ohio Revised Code (Section 5546-1, Ohio General
Code) and therefore invalid. As a further proposition, the court held that
the seller's overpayment was an "erroneous" mistake of fact within Section
5739.07 Ohio Revised Code (Section 5546-8, Ohio General Code) and that
the seller did not first have to reimburse the buyer under this section before
bringing his refund suit, but that the seller could bring his action, obtain a
refund, and then reimburse the buyer.
Sales of specially designed and equipped motor vehicles which were
necessary and used exclusively for keeping a public telephone or electric sys-
tem in continuous operation or repair were not taxable "retail sales" within
Section 5739.01 Ohio Revised Code (Section 5546-1, Ohio General Code)
because such sales are within the exclusion of that section for property used
"directly in the rendition of a public utility service." Rule 46 promulgated
by the Tax Commissioner and holding contrary to this decision was declared
invalid as contrary to the statute.
On the other hand, sales by a dental laboratory of dentures to dentists on
their order were held taxable.4 The court found that the dentists altered
and fit the dentures to meet the patient's needs. Therefore the sales by
the dental laboratory to the dentists were not excluded from tax under Sec-
tion 5739.01 Ohio Revised Code (Section 5546-1, Ohio General Code) on
the grounds that the "consumer [dentist] is to resell the thing transferred
in the form on which the same is, or is to be, received by him." The court
also stated that sales of dentures by dentists to patients were exempt under
Section 5739.02 Ohio Revised Code (Section 5546-2, Ohio General Code)
as "professional service transactions which involve sales as inconse-
quential elements, for which no separate charge is made." This tune the
court concurred with the Tax Commissioner's Rule 102 which states, inter
alia, that dentists are exempt from sales tax when they install dentures in
patients. Since the dentists are exempt in their "sales" of dentures the
burden of collecting the tax falls on the dental laboratories.
The time within which the Tax Commissioner may make an assessment
for sales taxes is the four year period prescribed in Section 5739.16 Ohio
Revised Code (Section 5546-9d, Ohio General Code) " The court has held6
that the Commissioner may make a second assessment within that period
3Athens Home Tel. Co. v. Peck, 158 Ohio St 557, 110 N.E.2d 571 (1953).
Fritz v. Peck, 160 Ohio St. 90, 113 N.E.2d 627 (1953)
5 See also, OHIo REv. CODE § 5703.05 (Omo GEN. CODE § 1464-3 (9)).
'Daiquiri Club, Inc. v. Peck, 159 Ohio St. 52, 110 N.E.2d 705 (1953). Accord,
Petrarca v. Peck, 159 Ohio St. 377, 112 N.E.2d 378 (1953).
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based upon correct records made available to him upon a second audit of the
taxpayer's books.
.Inheritance and Estate Taxes
The majority of inheritance tax cases during the past year involved the
question of whether the transfers qualified for a charitable exemption. A
bequest was made to the National Holiness Missionary Society which was
chartered to maintain and did maintain interdenominational missions at
home and abroad "to spread Scriptural holiness" throughout the world, and
to accomplish this purpose through evangelistic, medical, educational, and
industrial service departments. The Society operated a number of schools
in foreign countries and approximately 74 per cent of its expenditures were
made in operation of its schools which are open to all. The court7 found,
however, that the schools were operated subservient to the religious purposes
of the Society. Therefore, the Society was primarily a religious organization
and transfers to it are not exempt under Section 5731.09, Ohio Revised
Code (Section 5334, Ohio General Code) as bequests to a "public institu-
tion of learning." The Ohio courts have long helds that bequests to religious
organizations are not exempt under Section 5731.09, Ohio Revised Code
(Section 5334, Ohio General Code) as transfers "to or for the use of an
institution for purposes only of public charity." In the principal case, the
supreme court relied heavily upon a New Jersey case' in which the New
Jersey court indicated that a bequest to one of the individual schools operated
by a religious organization would be exempt. Perhaps the Ohio courts
would accept this "exception" to the general rule of non-exemption of be-
quests to religious institutions.
The adoption of such an "exception" received support from the reason-
ing of another case'0 although a charitable exemption was ultimately denied
by the court. A bequest was made to the "Archdiocese of Cincinnati and
the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cincinnati to be used for the sup-
port and furtherance of such charitable, benevolent, scientific and educa-
tional works and activities of such archdiocese as may be designated by said
archbishop." The court had no doubt about the gift's being one for publia
charity within the requirement of Section 5731.09, Ohio Revised Code
(Section 5334, Ohio General Code) that the bequest be to an "institution
TIn re Osborn's Estate, 159 Ohio St. 63, 110 N.E.2d 791 (1953), allirmmg, 65
Ohio L Abs. 561, 115 N.E.2d 427 (Lorain Probate, 1951)
'In re Taylor's Estate, 139 Ohio St. 417, 40 N.E.2d 936 (1942); In re Julian's
Estate, 93 Ohio App. 221, 113 N.E.2d 127 (1952); In re Weld, 71 Ohio App. 497,
50 N.E.2d 275 (1942)
9 Board of Nat. Missions of Presbyterian Church v. Neeld, 9 N.J. 349, 88 A.2d 500
(1952)
"In re Julian's Estate, 93 Ohio App. 221, 113 N.E.2d 129 (1952)
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for purposes only of public charity." But because one of the four classifi-
cations to which gifts could be made by the archbishop was for "charitable
works," the court said the bequest was not exempt. Under the "charitable
works" classification, the archbishop could use the bequest for religious pur-
poses and such purposes are not those of "public charity" within Section
5731.09, Ohio Revised Code (Section 5334, Ohio General Code) accord-
ing to the Ohio courts." The decision does imply, however, that if the arch-
bishop was limited to using the bequest for "scientific and educational"
activities (and, perhaps, "benevolene' activities, if that term is not synony-
mous with "charitable") the bequest would have been exempt even though
made to the head of a religious organization.
In re Oglebay's Estate'2 involved a split bequest. The residue of the
estate was left to a bank as trustee to hold legal title and to distribute income
and principal as the distribution committee of a charitable foundation di-
rected. Because the distribution committee could direct that up to one-half
of the income and corpus of the trust should go for out-of-state charitable
purposes, the court held that the committee constituted two "institution[s]
for purposes only of public charity" within Section 5731.09, Ohio Revised
Code (Section 5334, Ohio General Code), one institution for distributing
funds in Ohio, and, one for distributing funds out-of-state. Furthermore,
the bequest to the institution which could distribute funds out-of-state was
not exempt because the statute requires such an institution to operate sub-
stantially within Ohio. Thus since one of the "institutions" could spend
one-half of the bequest out-of-state, the one-half over which that institution
had the power of disposition was non-exempt.
The question of the taxation of bequests for the saying of masses came
again before the supreme court this past year. A few years ago the court
held' 3 that where a sum was left in trust, the income or principal of which
was to be paid in weekly installments to the pastors of designated churches
for the purpose of saying masses for testatrix and designated relatives, the
trust was a taxable succession. The trust was not exempt as one for public
charity only within Section 5731.09, Ohio Revised Code (Section 5334, Ohio
General Code). In the latest case' 4 on this subject, the decedent's will ap-
pointed the executrix trustee of the residue of the estate and gave the execu-
trix discretionary power to select priests to say masses for testatrix and her
family, and to determine the amount to be paid priests until the fund was
exhausted. The probate court held that although a "succession" to property
occurred it was not a taxable "succession" within Section 5731.02, Ohio
'See cases supra, note 8.
" 113 N.E.2d 726 (Ohio App., 1953).
'In re Estate of Reilly, 138 Ohio St 145, 33 N.E.2d 987 (1941).
"In re Shanahan's Estate, 159 Ohio St. 487, 112 N.E.2cd 665 (1953)
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Revised Code (Section 5332, Ohio General Code) because it was not a be-
quest to any identifiable person. The court of appeals affirmed. The
supreme court reversed, however, on the theory that there was a passing of
property to identifiable persons, that is, to the executrix as trustee and to
the priest to be selected by the trustee. Therefore, the bequest was taxable
under Section 5731.02, Ohio Revised Code (Section 5332, Ohio General
Code)
The case of In re Daiel's Estate15 again considered the problems of
whether there was a taxable "passing" of property within the requirements
of Section 5731.02, Ohio Revised Code (Section 5332, Ohio General Code)
Here an employee pension fund was involved. The fund was admimstered
by an independent trustee. All contributions to the fund were made by the
employer, the amounts being credited to each employee's account according
to his annual salary. The employer had no rights or powers over the fund
except to require distribution according to the terms of the trust agreement.
The trust provided for payments to the employee after reaching 65, and
for payments to his designated beneficiary (or if none to his-estate) if he
died before reaching that age. Here the employee died at 54. The pay-
ment to the deceased employee's designated beneficiary was held a taxable
passing of property by the deceased to the beneficiary within Section
5731.02, Ohio Revised Code (Section 5332, Ohio General Code). His
power to designate the beneficiary was the controlling factor in making the
transfer from the fund taxable. The court also emphasized that the em-
ployee could only be divested of his interest in the fund by discharge for
fraud, dishonesty, or intentional damage or destruction of the employer's
property. The fact that the fund was protected from assignment, attach-
ment, or execution prior to the actual payment to employees or beneficiaries
did not affect its subjection to inheritance taxation.
In two further cases, a probate court' 6 reaffirmed the doctrine of Y.M.-
C.A. v. Dav ' that the residuary estate must bear the burden of estate taxes,
debts and other charges where the testator makes no specific apportionment
of such claims against the estate. The court did not think that the supreme
court's decision in McDougall v. Central Nat. Bank' had changed the rule
of Y.M.C.A. v. Davws, nor that the McDougall case has established a blanket
apportionment rule in Ohio law. In the second case," the court held two
promissory notes owned by a decedent domiciled in Ohio subject to tax even
"In re Daniel's Estate, 159 Ohio St. 109, 111 N.E.2d 252 (1953), affirming, 93
Ohio L Abs. 123, 112 N.E.2d 56 (App., 1952).In re Coles Estate, 111 N.E.2d 35 (Clinton Probate, 1952).
17106 Ohio St. 366, 140 N.E. 114 (1922), af'd, 264 U.S. 47, 44 Sup. Ct. 291
(1924)
" 157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N.E.2d 441 (1952).
"Dept. of Taxation v. Weber, 113 N.E.2d 141 (Ohio App. 1953).
[Spring
SURVEY OF OHIO LAW- 1953
though the notes were secured by mortgages on New York realty and the
business sites of the notes was in New York. The court seems correct in
stating that the tax does not violate the 14th Amendment of the Federal Con-
sttution in accordance with the theory of Curry v. McCanless.20
Real Property
A number of cases under this heading involved the effect of the failure of
county officers to follow statutory procedures in the forfeiture or sale of
lands for nonpayment of real property taxes. Magennts v. Myers2' involved
a successful action by the former owner of land forfeited for nonpayment of
taxes to set aside a sale by a county auditor. The auditor in the notice of sale
failed to set forth the list of parcels separately, together with taxes and other
charges remaining unpaid, as required by Section 5723.10 Ohio Revised
Code (Section 5754, Ohio General Code) And, at the sale of the land the
auditor failed to offer each tract of land, lot or part of lot separately under
the requirement of Section 5723.06 Ohio Revised Code (Section 5752, Ohio
General Code) In this case the action to set aside the auditor's sale was
brought within one year from the date of the sale. In two other cases,22
however, where actions were brought to restore lands to their former owner
or declare his title superior after the auditor had failed to follow statutory
procedures in the sale of tax delinquent land, the former owners were
denied recovery. In both cases the owner's actions were held barred by Sec-
tion 5723.13 Ohio Revised Code (Section 5762-1, Ohio General Code)
which establishes a one year statute of limitations relating to actions for the
restoration of lands due to irregularity, informality, or omission in proceed-
ings relative to foreclosure, forfeiture or sale.
Taylor v. Monroe23 arose out of a forfeiture and sale for nonpayment of
taxes, but the former owner was not suing for restoration of his property.
Instead the former owner claimed that whereas certain of the delinquent
taxes assessed against his property were valid, on the other hand certain
special assessments were invalid. Therefore, he maintained that he was
entitled under Section 5723.11 Ohio Revised Code (Section 5757, Ohio
General Code) to recover from the county treasurer any excess which the
treasurer received on the sale of the land over the amount due for the ad-
mittedly valid delinquent taxes. That is, the former owner argued that
he should recover from the treasurer any excess which the treasurer received
' 307 U.S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct. 900 (1939). See also Pearson v. McGraw 308 U.S.
313, 60 Sup. Ct 211 (1939).
' 158 Ohio St. 405, 109 N..2d 849 (1952).
'Bliss Realty, Inc. v. Darash, 158 Ohio St. 287, 109 N.E.2d 276 (1952); Ulmer v.
Honeywell, 113 N.E.2d 143 (Ohio App., 1952)
2 158 Ohio St. 266, 109 N.E.2d 271 (1952)
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at the sale not necessary to reimburse the state for the taxes validly assessed.
The county treasurer argued that even though the special assessments were
invalid, the judgment 24 ordering the land forfeited to the state for non-
payment of taxes, and the judgment " ordering issuance of a certificate of
title under the Torrens Act to the purchaser at the tax sale barred the former
owner from daiming that the special assessments were invalid. The court
allowed recovery, however, noting that the plaintiff was not questioning
the tide, but only that certain of the assessments were void and that he should
be entitled to the amount which the state collected from the sale of the
property for the void assessments. Section 5723.11 Ohio Revised Code
(Section 5757, Ohio General Code) permits suit within six years from
date of the tax sale.
Two further real property tax cases of the past year involved problems
of valuation and collection. In one matter2" the City of Cleveland appealed
to the court of common pleas for a reconsideration of the valuation which
the county board of revision had placed on the city's municipal stadium.
The court of common pleas merely reviewed the record made before the
county board of revision and affirmed the board's decision. The court of
appeals reversed holding that under Section 5717.05, Ohio Revised Code
(Section 5611-5, Ohio General Code) the court of common pleas must try
the matter de novo on appeal and arrive at its own determination of valua-
non based on the evidence in the record and other evidence introduced at
the hearing before the court. In the second case,2" a county treasurer was
denied recovery in an action to subject rents and income from real property
to payment of delinquent taxes under Section 5719.27 Ohio Revised Code
(Section 5703, Ohio General Code) The real property had been devised
to a life tenant with remainder to the United States. The court stated that
the tax in Ohio is on the whole tide; there is no tax on any lesser interest in
the property. Furthermore, the court held that Ohio cannot constitutionally
tax the interest of the United States. Thus, the court concluded that to
collect taxes from the life tenant on the whole tide would be invalid as a
tax against the United States in part, and it also would be discriminatory and
lacking in due process as to the life tenant. The only solution in this situa-
tion would seem to be the enactment of a special tax against the life tenant's
interest.2 Note that a similar situation could arise where the remainderman
is an organization exempt from tax.29
24 OHIO REV. CODE § 5721.17 (OHIo GEN. CODE § 57 1 8-1c)
2OHIo REV. CODE § 5309.60 (OHIo GEN. CODE § 8572-58).
:'Cleveland v. Cuyahoga County Board of Revision, 115 N.E.2d 690 (Ohio App.,
1953).
' O'Brien v. Givens, 91 Ohio App. 549, 109 N.E.2d 293 (1952).
"Compare OHIO REV. CODE § 5713.04 (OHIo GEN. CODE §§ 5560, 5561)
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On the problem of exemption from the tax, the supreme court again
faced the problem of whether exemption is permissible where a part of
the property is used for non-exempt purposes. In 1949 the legislature
amended former Section 5560, Ohio General Code (now Section 5713.04,
Ohio Revised Code) to provide that if property under a single ownership
were owned separately" so that part thereof, if separate entity, would be
exempt from taxation, and the balance thereof would not be exempt from
taxation, the listing thereof shall be split, and the part thereof used ex-
clusively for an exempt purpose shall be regarded as a separate entity and
be listed as exempt, and the balance " shall be subject to tax. In 1952
the supreme court3 ° rejected the contention that where part of a building was
used for charitable purposes and part for noncharitable purposes, the build-
ing could be divided on a percentage basis and the part used for non-
charitable purposes could be taxed and the remainder would be exempt. The
court seemed to feel that a division would have to be made on an "entity"
basis, that is, the charitable activities must be carried on in separate build-
ings, although on the same property, to receive different tax treatment. But
in a recent case,31 a majority of the supreme court seemed to overrule their
1952 decision without so stating. This case involved a church building
which had a Sunday school room, baptistry, and furnace and laundry room
in the. basement; church auditorium and Sunday school rooms on the first
-floor and living quarters for the minister and family and the janitor and
family on the second floor. The majority held3 2 that the first floor and
Sunday school room and baptistry in the basement were used for tax-exempt
purposes and, therefore, under the above statute might be set off as exempt
from taxation not on a percentage basis but by a "split valuation of the sepa-
rate entities of the property." The decision seems in accord with the
statute but impossible to reconcile except on highly formal grounds with
the court's 1952 decision. In any event, the latest holding should prove a
boon to charitable organizations which have feared losing their entire. ex-
emption if any noncharitable activities were carried on in their building.33
Tangible Personal Property Tax
Most of the problems arising under taxation of tangible personal prop-
erty are those of exemption and exclusion. In Colomal Foundry Co. v.
" See Mehne v. Dillon, 203 Ind. 346, 165 N.E. 908 (1929) cited in the O'Bren case,
.supra.
, Goldman v. The L. B. Harrison, 158 Ohio St. 181, 107 N.E.2d 530 (1952), dis-
cussed in Latcham, Survey of Ohro Law-1952, Taxatson, 4 WEsT. RES. L. REV.
259, 263 (1953).
" Trustees of Church of God v. Board of Tax Appeals, 159 Ohio St. 517, 112 N.E.2d
.633 (1953).
SWeygandt, C. J., and Matthias and Zimmerman, J.J., dissented.
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Peck 4 the court upheld a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals that flasks,
cast iron shapes, weights, and clamps are excluded from the tax on personal
property under Section 5701.03, Ohio Revised Code (Section 5325, Ohio
General Code) as "dies" where such articles are used in the manufacture of
castings of special and varying designs and for the most part are not re-
used.3 5 For tangible personal property (other than domestic animals) to
be subject to tax it must be "used in business,"' 6 a phrase which is variously
defined by Section 5701.08, Ohio Revised Code (Section 5325-1, Ohio
General Code) For example, under this section personal property is
"used in business" and therefore taxable when " kept and maintained
as a part of a plant capable of operation. " Machinery and equipment
do not come within this description, and are therefore not taxable, where
they are in the process of construction and erection for use in a manufactur-
ing plant likewise in the process of construction and erection.31 The dis-
tinguishing feature here is that the plant itself was not yet in operation. If
it had been, the machinery, though not yet completely erected, would have
been taxable.38 As a second example, Section 5701.08, Ohio Revised Code
(Section 5325-1, Ohio General Code) provides that " merchandise or
agricultural products belonging to a nonresident of this state is not used
in business in this state if held in a storage warehouse for storage only.
Tobacco was stored in a warehouse in Ohio for shipment out-of-state where
the actual manufacturing process was conducted. Upon its arrival at the
warehouse, the tobacco was heated, subjected to aeration, and then repacked
to prevent disease. These processes had nothing to do with the actual manu-
facturing process. On these facts, the court held that the tobacco came within
the above quoted exclusion and was not taxable.3 9
Exemption from tax was also granted to personal property used in the
operation by the City of Cleveland of the Municipal Airport, Highland Park
Golf Course, Seneca Golf Course, Public Markets, Municipal Water Works,
Municipal Light Plant, and Public Auditorium." The courts found the
properties to be within the constitutional and statutory exemptions4' be-
cause there was an absence of a profit motive in the operation of the
' See, e.g. Mussio v. Glander, 149 Ohio St. 423, 79 N.E.2d 233 (1948); Welfare
Federation v. Glander, 146 Ohio St. 146, 64 N.E.2d 813 (1945)
' 158 Ohio St. 296, 109 N.E.2d 11 (1952)
' Cf. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Evatt, 143 Ohio St. 71, 54 N.E.2d 132 (1944)
"OHIO REV. CODE S 5709.01 (OHIo GEN. CODE § 5328)
" Nat. Distillers Products Corp. v. Peck, 158 Ohio St. 369, 109 N.E.2d 493 (1952)
' See Standard Oil Co. v. Glander, 155 Ohio St. 61, 98 N.E.2d 8 (1951), distin-
guished in the Nat. Dsstillers case, supra.
" General Cigar Co. v. Peck, 159 Ohio St. 152, 111 N.E.2d 265 (1953)
' State ex rel. Hepperla v. Glander, 114 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio App., 1952), a I'd per
curtam, 160 Ohio St. 59, 113 N.E.2d 357 (1953).
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properties and they were conducted for public benefit and in furtherance
of a public purpose. It was necessary to distinguish this case from Cleve-
land v. Board of Appeals2 where the Cleveland Municipal stadium was
held taxable as a proprietary function. The distinction was not dearly
made, the court asserting that the tests are "not too well established" and
that the "factual situation" of each case must be considered.43
The Code permits personal property to be taxed at 50 per cent (instead
of 70 per cent) of its average value where it is held by a manufacturer to
be used in the manufacturing process.44 A company which purchases used
but unusable machine tools which it rebuilds or reconditions for service by
supplying needed parts and which it resells to the trade generally is a manu-
facturer45 of such tools and they may be valued at 50 per cent of their average
value for tax purposes. The company is not merely a "repairer" said the
court.4 6
Other Taxes
A few cases arose under the tax on intangible personal property. In
Red Top Brewng Co. v. Peck47 the court held that where customers make
deposits with a brewery for bottles, cases and cartons, and the brewery is
obligated unconditionally to repay such deposits upon return to the brewery
of the bottles, cases and cartons, in whatever condition they may be, such
deposits constitute "current accounts payable' within the meaning of
Section 5701.07, Ohio Revised Code (Section 5327, Ohio General Code)
which defines the term "credits" which are taxable under the tax on in-
tangible property. 8 In a second intangible property tax case the court49 re-
jected the Tax Commissioner's Rule 224 which exempts from taxation ac-
counts receivable arising out of business transacted out of Ohio and which
are used in business transacted out of Ohio. The court relying on an earlier
decision50 stated Rule 224 conflicted with Section 5709.02, Ohio Revised
Code (Section 5328-1, Ohio General Code) in that such accounts re-
"Omio CoNsT iTrLoN, Art. XII, § 2; Omo Rnv. CoDE 5§ 5709.08, 5709.10,
5709.11 (OHio GEN. CODE 55 5351, 5356, 5357).
" 153 Ohio St. 97, 91 N.E.2d 480 (1950).
* State ex rel. Hepperla v. Glander, 114 N.E.2d 753, 759 (1952).
OHIO REV. CODE 5 5711.22 (Omo GEN. CODE 5 5388)
4"OHio REv. CODE 5 5711.16 (OHio GEN. CODE § 5385)
"Eastern Mach. Co. v. Peck, 160 Ohio St. 144, 114 N.E.2d 55 (1953).
4T 158 Ohio St. 259, 109 N.E.2d 4 (1952).
SOHIq Rnv. CODE 5 5709.02 (01O GEN. CODE S 5328-1).
"Hoover Co. v. Peck, 160 Ohio St. 64, 113 N.E.2d 85 (1953).
' Ransom & Randolph Co. v. Evatt, 142 Ohio St. 398, 52 N.E.2d 738 (1944). The
Tax Commissioner argued that this case had been overruled by Wheeling Steel Corp.
v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 69 Sup. Ct. 1291 (1949), but the court ruled otherwise.
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